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Should Banks Be Required to Adopt 
the Reporting Requirements of the SEC? 
by Louis A . M A C K E N Z I E 
Partner, New York Office 
Presented before the Columbus Chapter of The Ohio 
Society of Certified Public Accountants—December 1965 
TONIGHT I have been asked to discuss with you for a few minutes the question, "Should Banks Be Required to Adopt the Reporting Re-
quirements of the S E C ? " 
Let me be brief. The answer to that one, at least in my opinion, is 
an unequivocal yes. But, is the answer that simple? For a few minutes, 
let us consider the recent legislation affecting bank reporting. 
About one hundred years ago an event took place that has had a 
profound effect on the banking industry. That event was the approval 
by President Lincoln of the Act of February 25, 1863, providing for a 
system of national banks chartered and supervised by the Comptroller 
of the Currency, under the general direction of the Secretary of the 
Treasury. This Act , known as the National Currency Act , and referred 
to by many as the Free Banking B i l l , attracted scant notice in the 
Nation's press of that day; as a matter of fact, in one New York City 
daily it was covered by the following three-line insert in a column on 
Washington miscellany: 
The Free Banking B i l l , it is understood, 
was approved by President Lincoln 
early in the week. 
In spite of the lack of publicity, I am sure that everyone in this 
room wil l agree with me that, with the stroke of a pen, President Lincoln 
set in motion a chain of events that in time helped to stabilize and 
strengthen the Nation's economy. Regulation, in short, has been healthy, 
for the aims of the federal government in its supervision of banks has 
been to protect depositors' funds and to assure the ability of banks to 
continue service to their communities. 
On August 20, 1964, just a little over a hundred years after the 
signing of the National Currency Act of 1863, President Johnson 
signed into law the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964 whereby, 
among other things, public disclosure provisions concerning certain 
financial information became applicable to unlisted corporations having 
$1 million or more of assets and 750 or more stockholders of a single 
class. These provisions extend to the banking industry. 
This Act , unlike the 1863 Act , has received reams of publicity, 
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particularly as it affects the banking industry; but like the 1863 Act , 
its effect on the industry wil l also be profound, as it now appears. 
Changes in the industry during the past hundred years have been 
many, and few would deny that change many times contributes greatly 
to growth and strength and usefulness. 
H o w wil l this legislation affect the industry? The Congress has 
now told an important sector of industry to change its attitudes and 
policies on accounting. 
A s background, the powers, functions, and duties vested in the 
Securities and Exchange Commission to administer and enforce the 
Acts with respect to the securities of banks are transferred to the fed-
eral bank supervisory agencies. These agencies, and the banks reporting 
to them, are: 
AGENCY BANK 
Board of Governors of the State-chartered banks that are 
Federal Reserve System members of Federal Reserve 
Federal Deposit Insurance State-chartered banks insured 
Corporation ( F D I C ) by F D I C but not members 
of the Federal Reserve 
Comptroller of the Currency National banks 
Securities and Exchange A n y other bank not covered 
Commission by the above-mentioned 
Let me repeat, however, that the Acts apply only to those banks with $1 
million or more in assets and 750 or more stockholders of a single class. 
Banking analysts have estimated that about 600 of the country's 14,000 
banks are affected by the legislation, of which approximately 200 are 
State-chartered members of the Federal Reserve, 100 are State-char-
tered non-member banks, and 300 are National banks. In these figures, 
however, we may find an anomaly, which to me as a professional 
accountant is most disturbing. The nationally chartered banks that are 
required to register their securities may do so by filing with the Comp-
troller's Office two copies of their annual report, whereas State-char-
tered banks and members of the Federal Reserve must comply with 
Regulation F . 
The Securities Acts Amendments of 1964 were put together after 
the S E C made its study of the securities markets and issued its huge 
report entitled Report of a Special Study of the Securities Markets. 
The Banking authorities, namely, the Federal Reserve and the F D I C , 
favored the b i l l ; the lone dissenter was the Comptroller of the Currency, 
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James J . Saxon, who felt that the Act's provisions were not needed for 
banks; however, in all fairness, he favored the principle of disclosure. 
He felt that the bill was not needed inasmuch as the various authorities 
already had the authority to act. But, have they acted? It is fair to say 
that most of the supervisory authorities have issued regulations and 
rules that have been primarily for depositor protection rather than for 
stockholder protection. 
Will iam McChesney Martin, Chairman of the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System when the congressional hearings on the 
bill were being held in 1963, stated: 
The commercial banking system is one of the most closely supervised 
industries in the United States, subject to numerous laws and regula-
tions, detailed examination, and requirements of reports to bank super-
visors, both State and Federal. The objectives of bank supervision, 
however, are fundamentally different from those of the Securities 
Exchange Act. 
Bank supervision is intended to assist in maintaining a sound, service-
able banking structure and to protect bank depositors. As an incident 
to these principal functions, supervision also benefits bank shareholders 
in important ways. 
Nevertheless, most of the information about a bank that is developed 
by the supervisory authorities must necessarily be treated by them as 
confidential, and the data now available to a bank's shareholders or 
prospective shareholders do not appear to provide all that they would 
need in order to make sound investment decisions. 
A s all of us in this room are aware, banks have over the years 
employed accounting methods or practices that in their judgment have 
best suited their purposes. Bank accounting in the past generally has 
been influenced by panics, bank failures, the bank holiday of 1933, et 
cetera, and hence the emphasis swung to depositor protection. The 
enactment of insured deposit legislation and the emphasis on conserva-
tive banking practices illustrate the trend. Some of these practices 
were: 
1) Listing of Debits and Credits, which by some was called a 
statement of condition and was made available for depositors, stock-
holders, and prospective stockholders. It was an extreme rarity to find 
published Income Statements as we know and think of them. 
2) Fixed assets often were written down; furniture and fixtures 
were charged off to expense and no depreciation taken. 
3) Reserves were used to conceal income. Many times provisions 
were made to increase reserves in good years so as to take care of losses 
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in poor years; reserves were then a convenient method of income 
equalization. Items of income and expense have in the past been masked 
by transfers to or from reserves. I suppose that in the minds of some 
bankers such a practice contributed to the maintenance of stability. 
4) A s to investments, banks have traditionally shown securities 
at cost less amortization of premiums—premiums amortized to the 
earliest call or maturity date. Bankers have operated under the philos-
ophy that they are not in the business of buying and selling securities 
but of lending money through credit. The movement in their portfolios 
occurs because of the rise and fall of lending requirements. A s a result, 
premiums paid on securities purchased have been amortized, but dis-
counts on purchases have not. Thus, as to discount items, income is 
recorded on a coupon basis rather than on a yield basis. 
Listed below are some of the accounting treatments that commer-
cial banks in the past frequently followed with respect to premiums and 
discounts on securities. 
a) Neither premiums nor discounts on purchases were amortized. 
b) Premiums only were amortized. 
c) Both premiums and discounts were amortized. 
d) Both premiums and discounts were written off immediately. 
e) Premiums only were written off immediately. 
f) Discounts only were written off immediately. 
g) Some premiums were amortized and some premiums were 
written off immediately. 
h) Both premiums and discounts were amortized on U . S . govern-
ment securities only, and premiums only were amortized on 
the remaining securities. 
To an accountant this diversity is perplexing to say the least. The 
examples cited are several of many—and it may be true that banks in 
the past have had almost as many different accounting practices as 
Cleopatra had charms. Are such practices logical from the viewpoint 
of the stockholder—from one who expects to invest in the securities of 
a bank? Has there been a double standard? I'm sure you wil l agree 
with me that the banker in making loans expects to receive from his 
customer adequate financial information, and in many cases requires 
our opinion on such statements. Should the banker be excused from 
good accounting and reporting practices, especially when one considers 
that the banks may be competing for capital funds, debenture issues, 
equity, etc? 
What has been the effect of Regulation F ? 
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1) It is significant, I believe, that the banking industry, through its 
associations such as the American Bankers Association, N A B A C , the 
New York Clearing House, et al., has been working diligently since 
enactment to find further agreement on certain difficult accounting 
problems. 
2) Some of the country's leading bankers have taken the position 
that banks should show the way in making their reports to stockholders 
clear and consistent so that investors can make an intelligent judgment. 
In short: A stockholder of Bank X , or a person who is wondering 
whether to buy its stock, should be able to find out readily what sort of 
business the bank conducts, what its assets and liabilities are, the sources 
of its revenues, and the amount and trend of its earnings, and the 
many other things that an intelligent investor considers before deciding 
whether to buy, retain, or sell a security. 
The principle laid down by the Securities Act of 1933 was that no 
one could sell a new security to the public unless the public was first 
supplied with a prospectus outlining the important facts about the 
corporation—its business, its financial condition, the people who ran it, 
and its results of operations to date. The banks however were exempt. 
For thirty years banks escaped this impact. Now, however, it 
appears that full disclosure is here to stay as far as the banking industry 
is concerned. The composition of investors in bank securities has, like 
many other things, changed in the past quarter century. Bank stocks 
are no longer owned only by the relative few; the large middle class as 
well as the wealthy invest in bank equities. The Securities Acts Amend-
ments of 1964 legislation as applicable to banks was inevitable as in the 
public interest. 
A s accountants we nevertheless criticize some of the things in the 
present regulations—provisos that differ in intent from generally ac-
cepted accounting principles. A partial list would include: 
1) Market value of securities—Under present regulations, mar-
ket values of bonds of investment grade need not be disclosed. In my 
opinion market value of all bonds should be disclosed for two reasons: 
(a) to permit the reader to evaluate investment earning power, and (b) 
to permit the reader to evaluate the portfolio transactions. 
2) The accounting for stock dividends—Banks generally transfer 
from earned surplus to capital surplus only the par value of the divi-
dend. Under a generally accepted accounting principle the transfer 
would be made at market value and surplus account charged therefor. 
3) Provisions for bad debts—These charges, usually the full 
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amount permitted for tax purposes, now are all below the net operating 
earnings line, "net of tax." Although we admit this is an improvement 
over former practices, it leaves something to be desired. A t least that 
part representing management's best judgment of possible loss should 
be charged to operating earnings. The bad debt is a cost of doing 
business. 
4) Recognition of deferred taxes—Banks presently follow no uni-
form practice in providing for deferred taxes—some make provision 
and some do not. I see no reason why all banks should not do so. 
5) All-inclusive income statement—Regulations fail to call for 
captioning the final figure as Net Income for the Year. Traditionally, 
however, the banker has considered net operating earnings to be more 
important. 
6) Security profits and losses—Treating this item as a non-oper-
ating item is in my judgment acceptable as a bridge for the time being 
between former practice of reserving gains against the contingency of 
future losses from investments and loans, and including gains and losses 
in income. 
The new era of bank reporting is here and is here to stay, and its 
capstone is full and fair dsclosure. 
As is well known, bank reports need not contain an independent 
accountants' opinion since the regulations do not require one. Among 
the major New York banks, however, there appears to be a strong 
movement for change in this regard. A l l except one will have opinions 
from independent accountants in their annual reports for 1965. This 
trend is a challenge to our profession and we should therefore respond 
to it. The response should be with one thought in mind—that of render-
ing a service in accordance with a high standard of excellence. 
